
1 **His Fate Was Larger than Himself:**
 Andrei D. Sakharov’s Centenary

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The world-renowned physicist Andrei D. Sakharov (1921–1989) was ‘the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb’ and, as such, an architect of the Soviet superpower. He developed into a fierce fighter for human rights, distinguished by the Nobel Peace Prize. In his words, ‘my fate was larger than what would have followed from my personality. I was merely trying to be worthy of my fate.’¹ His life and career provide thought-provoking lessons and is worthy of review on the eve of his centennial.

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Under Soviet Reign

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Andrei D. Sakharov (1921–1989; Figure 1) was born into a Moscow family of intellectuals. His physicist father wrote physics texts and knew Igor Tamm, the future Nobel laureate theoretical physicist. Tamm was an associate of the Lebedev Physical Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Fizichesky Institut Akademii Nauk, known as FIAN) and later helped Andrei to launch his career. The young Sakharov studied physics at the Lomonosov Moscow State University and, although it was evacuated to Turkmenistan during the Second World War, teaching continued at a high level. After graduation, Sakharov was directed to a plant producing ammunition where he excelled with innovations. He met his future wife at this plant, Klavdia, ‘Klava’, Vikhireva (1919–1969). She had an incomplete degree in chemical technology and worked in chemical analysis. They married in 1943 and had three children, Tatyana, ‘Tanya’, in 1954; Lyubov, ‘Lyuba’, in 1949; and Dmitry, ‘Mitya’, in 1957. Tanya became a research biologist and Lyuba a librarian (she trained as a physicist). Mitya grew up being fraught with personal problems, worked

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1. ‘... судьба моя оказалась крупнее, чем моя личность. Я лишь старался быть на уровне собственной судьбы ...’ Андрей Сахаров 1988 г. From a poster at the Moscow Sakharov Archives.



Figure 1. Andrei Sakharov behind the microphone in 1989 (photograph by Anna D. Kudryavtseva, FIAN; courtesy of the Moscow Sakharov Archives).

27 as a photographer and held entrepreneurial jobs. In 1968, Klava was diagnosed with
28 advanced cancer to which she succumbed the following year.²

29 Following the war, Sakharov landed a position at FIAN. He was lucky to remain
30 untouched by the Stalinist terror raging in full force during the last years of the dic-
31 tator's life. In previous terrors, outstanding scientists perished – such as the brilliant
32 physicist Lev Shubnikov, the world-renowned biologist Nikolai Vavilov, and many
33 others. The future Nobel laureate theoretical physicist, Lev Landau, was brutally
34 incarcerated. Many scientists and technologists ended up in slave labour camps, such
35 as Sergei Korolev, the future leader of the Soviet space programme.

36 Sakharov was assigned to be a member of the group of experts, charged with
37 developing the Soviet hydrogen bomb without having been asked whether he wanted
38 to participate in this project or not. He moved, along with Tamm, to Sarov, the
39 closed atomic city, and started work at the secret nuclear laboratory Arzamas-16.
40 By then, the Soviet atom bomb had already been produced as a copy of American
41 design. For the hydrogen bomb, a genuine Soviet contribution was required.

2. She died of stomach cancer. There is no hard evidence, only anecdotal evidence, according to which many wives and daughters of Arzamas scientists died of cancer. Sakharov's family lived in Sarov from 1950 until 1968. Klavdia Vikhireva may have also had chemical poisoning at the ammunition plant where she worked during the war. That poisoning caused stomach ulcers from which she suffered for years. Those stomach ulcers may have also turned cancerous.



Figure 2. The statue of Andrei Sakharov with his bound hands behind his back (by L.K. Lazarev, unveiled in 2003) on Sakharov's Square in St Petersburg, with the university buildings in the background (photograph by the author).

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42 Sakharov participated in the project with dedication and great success. Three
 43 decades later, in the 1980s, at the time of his internal exile, he tried to understand
 44 his own unreserved enthusiasm in the 1950s for this horrible project. He did not serve
 45 in the Second World War, called the Great Patriotic War in Russia, but in the
 46 1950s he felt like a soldier in a new scientific-technological war. He considered
 47 the hydrogen bomb a necessary evil to protect his country against a more powerful
 48 enemy than Nazi Germany had been.

49 Two of the three basic ideas leading to the Soviet hydrogen bomb were
 50 Sakharov's; the third was Vitaly Ginzburg's, also a FIAN associate and also a future
 51 Nobel laureate. Ginzburg participated in the nuclear project only for a short while as
 52 he was not given security clearance. This was on account of his wife, Nina
 53 Ermakova, being in internal exile for having, ostensibly, participated in an anti-
 54 Stalin conspiracy long before she met Ginzburg. The accusation was unfounded
 55 and her exile ended after Stalin's death.

56 Prior to moving to Sarov, the secret nuclear installation, the official defence of
 57 Sakharov's candidate of science (PhD-equivalent) dissertation took place in 1947
 58 at FIAN. His research was about the theory of transitions in the atomic nuclei.
 59 The President of the Academy of Sciences, Sergei Vavilov, presided and two future
 60 members of the Academy, Arkady Migdal and Isaac Pomeranchuk, acted as the

61 official referees at the defence. Igor Tamm and another luminary of physics, academe-
62 mician Grigory Landsberg, took part in the discussion. Tamm emphasized
63 Sakharov's two traits essential for a theoretical physicist, which rarely occur in
64 the same person. One was the ability to grasp the problem qualitatively and arrive
65 at an approximate estimate of the solution. The other was to solve the problem by
66 exact mathematical tools. The Scientific Council of FIAN voted unanimously to
67 award Sakharov's scientific degree.

68 According to Sakharov's *Memoirs*, in spring 1953 the Soviet atom tsar, Igor
69 Kurchatov, initiated Sakharov's election to corresponding member of the
70 Academy. Sakharov was asked to compile the necessary documents for the election
71 anticipated in the fall of the same year. The prerequisite higher doctorate, the DSc
72 degree, was missing, and he acquired it in haste during the hectic work on the devel-
73 opment of the hydrogen bomb. This higher doctorate in the Soviet, now Russian,
74 system is also a prerequisite for a professorial appointment. Sakharov did not write
75 a full dissertation, only a summary of his most important results and the defence took
76 place in June at the secret laboratory. Fortunately, it employed more than the suffi-
77 cient number of qualified scientists to form a Scientific Council for granting his
78 higher doctorate. Igor Tamm was one of the referees whose report was never made
79 public, and is kept in Sakharov's private archive. It does not show a date and does
80 not contain the customary listing of the new scientific results. Yuly Khariton, the
81 scientific director of Arzamas-16, was another referee, and a sanitized version of
82 his report has appeared, dated 9 November 1953, as if it had been compiled after
83 the Academy elections. Khariton mentions Sakharov's achievements in connection
84 with the development of the thermonuclear device.

85 Sakharov's scientific acumen was amply manifested in 1947 in his candidate
86 of science dissertation and in its defence. He could have been granted the higher
87 doctorate, skipping the candidate's degree, which is not common, but not too
88 extraordinary. His higher doctorate was arranged for during the critical period of AQ5
89 the preparation for the test of the experimental thermonuclear device during the sum-
90 mer of 1953. This shows how important his election to the Academy was considered
91 at the time. The first Soviet thermonuclear device – not yet a full-scale hydrogen
92 bomb – was tested on 12 August 1953, with complete success. Sakharov was elected
93 full member rather than corresponding member in the two-tier system of the Soviet
94 Academy of Sciences, on 23 October 1953. In this two-tier system, the corresponding
95 membership precedes the full membership and many corresponding members never
96 reach full membership. Skipping the corresponding membership is most exceptional.
97 Prior examples were Igor Kurchatov in 1943 and Lev Landau in 1946.

98 A few months following the successful August 1953 test, Sakharov received
99 his first gold star of 'Hero of Socialist Labour'. He was subsequently given this
100 highest recognition twice more, in 1956 and 1962, on both occasions following
101 successful tests of nuclear explosions. He became one of the most decorated
102 Soviet citizens – referred to often as the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb –
103 one of the prime architects of the superpower status of the Soviet Union.

104 **Personal Transition**

105 His first collision with the powers that be happened in 1955. Following a successful
 106 test – it was the first truly Soviet hydrogen bomb – there was a festive celebration.
 107 In his toast, Sakharov expressed his hope that the successful explosions will always
 108 happen over proving grounds and never over cities. All those present sensed that the
 109 scientist had wandered onto slippery grounds. The representative of Soviet official-
 110 dom hastened to correct him with a cautionary tale, to warn the scientist that
 111 he should leave politics to the politicians. This was the first time, but not the last,
 112 that he was shown his place in Soviet society. When the Soviet Union was preparing
 113 to explode the world's most powerful bomb, in June 1961, the supreme Soviet leader,
 114 Nikita Khrushchev, conveyed a meeting of the atomic scientists. On this occasion,
 115 Sakharov argued that there was no real dividend in deploying bombs of ever-increasing
 116 power, whereas their testing carried various dangers. This time, Khrushchev himself
 117 reprimanded the scientist and humiliated him publicly in front of the leading scientists
 118 and politicians.

119 Sakharov continued his work at Arzamas-16 for years and was returned to
 120 Moscow only in 1968 following his complete alienation from the weapons project.
 121 His actions were not determined by his emotions. From the mid-1950s, he was
 122 concerned about the possible biological consequences of the nuclear tests. He under-
 123 stood that the biological damages of the tests are non-threshold events; that is, there
 124 was no minimum dose beneath which any possible damage could be excluded. The
 125 impossible situation of the science of biology in the Soviet Union further enhanced
 126 his worries. He was among those physicists and chemists who felt an increasing
 127 responsibility to do something to counteract the tragedy of biology and biologists.
 128 They were suffering from the iron grip of the charlatan T.D. Lysenko who had
 129 enjoyed first Stalin's, then Khrushchev's virtually unlimited support.

130 On the one hand, Sakharov recognized the biological hazards of testing and felt hor-
 131 rified, witnessing the recklessness of the Soviet leadership in misusing the tests in their
 132 international power play. On the other hand, he was concerned to ensure the best pos-
 133 sible utilization of the weapons he helped create. At some point he considered the most
 134 efficient ways for deploying his horrific invention and approached a Soviet rear admi-
 135 ral, by the name of Fomin, with a proposal.³ He suggested equipping a submarine with
 136 a hydrogen bomb-torpedo that could be directed to an important Western harbour for
 137 maximum destruction. One might dismiss this story as improbable had it not been nar-
 138 rated by Sakharov in his *Memoirs* (Sakharov 1992, 221). Obviously, with hindsight, this
 139 tormented Sakharov. It is just another example of the long road he covered, from the
 140 creator of the tools by which Stalin and his successors might have held the democratic
 141 world hostage to a most dedicated fighter for democracy.

142 Sakharov carried out calculations to estimate the possible damage of nuclear tests,
 143 including the long-term impacts of the radioactive isotopes they produce. He estimated

3. Sakharov does not give the initials of the rear-admiral but, considering his career, he must be Petr F. Fomin (1904–1976) who commandeered the Soviet atomic submarines when they were first getting deployed.

144 that for every megaton (one million ton) TNT-equivalent (2,4,6-trinitrotoluene-
145 equivalent) nuclear explosion, there are ten thousand human victims.⁴ By 1957, the
146 nuclear explosions in the world reached 50 megaton TNT-equivalent; the estimated
147 number of human victims reached half a million. It was an ironic quirk of history that
148 Sakharov's estimates, at the time, helped Khrushchev's political interests. The Soviet
149 leader had declared a temporary moratorium on nuclear testing, whereas the
150 Americans continued testing. Sometime later, the Soviets renewed their nuclear
151 testing when Khrushchev's political interests so dictated. Sakharov proved power-
152 less in his attempts to block them.

153 Sakharov was still an associate of the Arzamas-16 laboratory when he took
154 an activist role during the Academy elections in 1964. He took a stand against
155 the election of an unworthy Lysenko protégé who had secured Party support.
156 As it turned out, other physicists had also formed an opposition and the candidate
157 was not elected. It was an unprecedented action in the history of seamless Party dom-
158 ination in the life of the Science Academy, as in everything else in the Soviet Union.
159 Sakharov was removed from Arzamas-16 in 1968 and returned to FIAN to continue
160 where he began 20 years before. By then, he became actively interested in politics,
161 initially directing his attention to general issues. He signed a protest against Stalin's
162 rehabilitation; joined a movement protesting against the pollution of Lake Baikal
163 in Siberia; and attended a silent demonstration, organized on the Day of the
164 Constitution, to protest against unlawfulness. His participation – he was an acade-
165 mician, three-time Hero of Socialist Labour – added weight to any movement
166 that had him in its midst. The authorities arrested demonstrators and protesters,
167 but never touched him.

168 **For Human Rights**

169 Gradually, Sakharov's attention moved from general issues to the protection of the
170 human rights of individuals. He attended trials of activists, fought against the use
171 of psychiatric incarceration and for the freedom of religion, against anti-Semitic
172 discrimination, for the right of emigration, and supported numerous other causes,
173 and was on the lookout for more. The Western media helped enhance his fame
174 and he recognized the power of the press.

175 It was a milestone when, in 1968, he published his pamphlet, smuggled out to the
176 West, *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*. It was
177 a tumultuous year, with the student movements and the Prague Spring and its ruth-
178 less suppression, which dissipated any hope for creating 'socialism with a human
179 face'. The world was thirsty for direction and many discovered it in Sakharov's
180 words. He warned the human race of the dangers of 'thermonuclear extinction,
181 ecological catastrophe, famine, uncontrolled population explosion, alienation, and

4. 1 megaton = 1000 kiloton, and, for comparison, the atom bomb over Hiroshima was 15-kiloton TNT-equivalent. For the number of human victims, Hiroshima could not serve for comparison because an atom bomb targeting a big city directly kills an enormous number of people.

182 dogmatic distortion of our conception of reality' (Sakharov 1992, 282). The pamphlet
 183 sold at least 18 million copies; only Mao Zedong's and Vladimir Lenin's books pre-
 184 ceded it on the bestseller list, and he left behind star authors such as Georges Simenon
 185 and Agatha Christie. In many places those in power felt threatened by Sakharov's
 186 views, and nowhere as much as in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities dreaded
 187 the intellectuals and their views; their fear bordered paranoia. They persecuted those
 188 who read the pamphlet as well as those who disseminated it. There was a long history
 189 of the Soviet authorities considering writers, poets, sociologists, and environmentalists
 190 their enemies, even though they possessed nothing except their ideas. Now, a world-
 191 renowned physicist, academician, a principal architect of the Soviet superpower
 192 had joined those powerless forces. Although he was a singularity, a lonely hero, he
 193 shattered this invincible and eternal – or so it believed – empire.

194 The widower Sakharov met Elena, 'Lusia', Bonner (1923–2011) in 1970 at a
 195 human rights event. She was a divorcee, a paediatrician, war hero, and a human rights
 196 activist. They married in 1972. Her children, Tatyana, 'Tanya', and Aleksei became
 197 close to him. Bonner was his faithful partner in his heightened human rights activities.
 198 When he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1975, he was prevented from attending
 199 the prize-awarding ceremony in Oslo so his wife represented him there. This was
 200 because, and it can be taken as symbolic, he was attending a trial of another human
 201 rights activist in Vilnius. In subsequent years, Sakharov multiplied his efforts in his
 202 fighting for human rights and for freeing incarcerated human rights activists. He did
 203 not shrink even from such drastic measures as going on hunger strike.

204 It says a great deal about the nature of the Soviet regime that among their many
 205 attempts to discredit Sakharov they intimated that he may be Jewish and spread
 206 stories that might incite anti-Semitic attacks against him – and they did. In his
 207 words, these attempts were 'calculated to arouse envy, malice, and all the instincts
 208 of the pogrom-makers' (Sakharov 1992, 431). Sakharov followed rigorously
 209 Igor Tamm's views on anti-Semitism, according to which 'one way of telling if **AQ6**
 210 someone belongs to the Russian intelligentsia. A true Russian *intelligent* is never
 211 an anti-Semite. If he's infected with that virus, then he's something else, something
 212 terrible and dangerous' (Sakharov 1992, 123).

213 Sakharov's dedication and determination rendered the authorities powerless, and in
 214 January 1980, they resorted to extreme action to curb his activities. They revoked all his
 215 awards and distinctions and, without any legal foundation, exiled him to the city of
 216 Gorky – now, as before, Nizhny Novgorod – which was a closed city for foreigners.
 217 They did not dare though revoke his membership in the Academy of Sciences.

218 During the next seven years the authorities kept him, and his wife, who joined
 219 him, in isolation. They allowed only once or twice annually one or two of his fellow
 220 physicist academicians at FIAN to visit him. An army of KGB agents kept harassing
 221 him, stole his manuscripts, scared away his would-be visitors, and did everything
 222 to make the Sakharovs' life as hard as possible. Even under these inhuman circum-
 223 stances Sakharov did not give up taking a stand in defence of others. He was
 224 followed every step, spied on all the time, his apartment was tapped, and he was lis-
 225 tened to when he talked with others. On one occasion, when he and his rare visitors

226 were to discuss some physics that included classified information, he stopped the
227 conversation. He noted that although he and his interlocutors possessed the highest
228 security clearance, the KGB officers listening clandestinely to their exchange might
229 not. Was he being serious or was he sarcastic? Probably both.

230 **The Academy of Sciences in the Background**

231 Sakharov's inhuman treatment continued during the reign of subsequent supreme
232 leaders, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail
233 Gorbachev. Sakharov continued his resistance, including firing off letters of protest
234 to these leaders. Sadly, the Academy of Sciences was among the instruments the
235 authorities enlisted in their efforts to break Sakharov's resolve. It was under
236 Brezhnev, in 1973, that 40 academicians signed a published letter that condemned
237 Sakharov's activities. The signatures were collected unscrupulously. Some of the
238 signatories were not even asked; their names were just added. They could not do this
239 though with everyone. The internationally renowned physicist Petr Kapitsa refused
240 to sign. Yakov Zeldovich, Sakharov's long-time colleague at Arzamas-16, was not
241 even approached. When the president of the Academy, Anatoly Aleksandrov, was
242 called, his wife picked up the receiver and told the caller that her husband was drunk
243 and could not come to the phone, so his signature was also missing. Publishing such
244 letters was a common practice in Soviet times and had become routine. There was a
245 very different letter published in 1983 at the time of Sakharov's exile. This letter was
246 signed by four academicians only, and they did indeed sign it. This letter condemned
247 Sakharov in extreme terms. One of the signatories was the Nobel laureate (1964)
248 laser pioneer Aleksandr Prokhorov and this action left a stain on his brilliant career.
249 It is interesting to note that current Russian officialdom is looking back on
250 Prokhorov's public demeanour with pointed appreciation. Alone among the great
251 generation of Soviet-time physicists, Prokhorov was honoured recently (2015) with
252 a large statue-memorial at one of Moscow's busiest intersections.

253 As alluded to above, the authorities did not revoke Sakharov's Academy
254 membership, but at one point during his exile he himself raised this issue.
255 By 1984, in the fourth year of his exile, he found his situation hopeless. He was
256 willing to resign from the Academy if the institution proved unable to assist him.
257 This was a drastic proposition, threatening even his livelihood, as the considerable
258 allotment as a full member of the Academy was his principal income at the time.
259 Fortunately, he did not have to resort to this drastic step.

260 **Sakharov and Gorbachev**

261 The 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev ascended to be the new Soviet leader in March
262 1985. Whether he was set to dismantle the Soviet regime or was being forced to agree
263 to one change after another, has been a question of contention. It is a fact though that
264 during Gorbachev's reign, Sakharov was kept in exile for 18 more long months.

265 During this time there were negotiations between Sakharov and the Gorbachev
 266 Administration about the terms of his liberation and return to Moscow. Even during
 267 these 18 months, Sakharov's harassment continued, and it happened that he had to
 268 resort to the extreme action of a hunger strike. Gorbachev was still hesitant about
 269 letting Sakharov free when his advisers urged him to do so. In most accounts,
 270 Gorbachev 'invited' Sakharov back to Moscow in December 1986, but in reality,
 271 and in Sakharov's own words, Gorbachev 'allowed' his return.

272 Upon Sakharov's return to Moscow he re-joined FIAN, but for the remaining
 273 three years of his life politics took over and physics played a diminishing role.
 274 His path and Gorbachev's intersected to an ever-increasing degree. Initially, the
 275 almighty secretary general, then, president, was almost unapproachable for the
 276 'meddlesome' and 'impertinent' intellectual who, rapidly, had become an important
 277 player in the Moscow political scene. Sakharov had to be reckoned with unless a
 278 politician was ready to ignore the entire intellectual class. At that time this was impos-
 279 sible and unthinkable – today though this is a different matter, as we are observing the
 280 diminishing role of this class. Sakharov's statements and criticism are worthy of remem-
 281 bering lest we let the distance in time alter history, belittle Sakharov's role in advancing
 282 democratic change, and camouflage Gorbachev's resistance to it.

283 Sakharov sharply criticized Gorbachev when, in February 1986, the Secretary
 284 General declared that there were no longer political prisoners in the Soviet Union
 285 and no one was persecuted for political views. This was a false statement as
 286 Sakharov himself, still in exile, was direct proof of the opposite. There were still
 287 numerous political prisoners. One of their most outstanding representatives, the
 288 48-year-old Anatoly Marchenko died in prison later in 1986. Sakharov protested
 289 when Gorbachev's administration initially treated the Chernobyl catastrophe as
 290 an insignificant accident, misleading even Sakharov himself. Sakharov later narrated
 291 events – by then he was a witness upon his joining the political scene – in which
 292 Gorbachev behaved dictatorially at various gatherings and debates, and tended
 293 to apply non-democratic approaches, allegedly in order to protect democracy.
 294 Sakharov recorded his observations about Gorbachev's tendency to concentrate
 295 power in his own hands and observed a deep gap between Gorbachev's words
 296 and deeds both in his economic and social policies. He was a political leader
 297 who had not yet got used to acquiring political leadership via elections and let his
 298 prejudices influence his decisions. Sakharov's uncompromising pro-democracy stand
 299 often irritated Gorbachev, who aired his irritation. He was unable to apply his policy
 300 of *glasnost* to his own demeanour and tended to limit *openness* in his own political
 301 activities. Sakharov tried to curb Gorbachev's attempts to grab all power while he
 302 also recognized that the new political leader represented a token of progress.

303 **Sakharov's Science**

304 Sakharov was an internationally renowned physicist whose achievements earned him
 305 broad recognition. Alas, he could devote only a fraction of his time to science, and

306 even less to basic science. Such a period was the three years at FIAN immediately
307 after the war when he was doing his research in preparation for his candidate of
308 science degree. Some of his work on the thermonuclear bomb he also considered
309 to be true physics. In this, he was not alone. Enrico Fermi did not think it a waste
310 of the time that he spent on developing the nuclear bombs. I am not referring to the
311 importance of the nuclear weapons in preserving peace through mutual deterrence.
312 Rather, much of it was *interesting* physics (Fermi's expression was *good* physics), full
313 of challenges for bona fide researchers. During his two decades at the secret atom
314 laboratory, however, Sakharov had hardly any chance to do physics other than what
315 was connected to thermonuclear science. The only opportunity was what came
316 through his fellow physicist Yakov Zeldovich, who was eight years his senior.
317 These eight years of difference meant that Zeldovich had built up a network of
318 connections with other physicists in Moscow prior to the Second World War.
319 This helped him stay alert as far as the rapid progress in physics was taking place
320 in the 1950s and 1960s. His engagement provided stimulus for Sakharov who was
321 rather slow in building interactions with his peers. His 1968 return to Moscow
322 and to FIAN also meant his return to fundamental physics. However, his involve-
323 ment with human rights issues was gradually taking away an increasing amount of
324 his time from research. Then came the exile, 1980–1986, making it almost impossible
325 to continue doing his physics. It is a manifestation of his extraordinary talent and
326 dedication that during the 1968–1986 period he produced new results and weighty
327 publications that added to his international recognition as a most significant contrib-
328 utor to his science. After his return to Moscow in December 1986, he had hardly any
329 opportunity to continue in physics.

330 In light of the above, it may seem surprising that his original scientific contribu-
331 tions amounted to a 500-page densely printed volume, published by FIAN
332 (Sakharov 1995). His achievements in the following three areas are especially
333 noteworthy: plasma physics, the physics of elementary particles, and cosmology.
334 Sakharov was the first among Soviet physicists who suggested the application of
335 lasers for controlled thermonuclear reactions. In addition, he was the first to suggest
336 the utilization of neutrons from fusion reactors to produce fission fuels for nuclear
337 reactors. He suggested techniques for the production of extremely strong magnetic
338 fields. Along with fellow Soviet physicists, he initiated the development of *tokamak*,
339 which is the Russian term for a hot plasma confined to a torus-shape by a powerful
340 magnetic field, which could lead to energy production by the controlled thermonu-
341 clear reaction of fusion.

342 In the physics of elementary particles (today, more often referred to as fundamen-
343 tal particles) he estimated the masses of some of these particles on the basis of
344 the structure of the most fundamental building blocks of matter, the so-called
345 quarks. He communicated his most important, certainly his best known, result
346 involving the interpretation of the so-called baryon asymmetry of the universe.
347 Protons and neutrons are the most common baryons and they constitute much of
348 the known mass of the universe. The baryon–antibaryon asymmetry is part of the
349 fundamental issue of our universe consisting of matter rather than antimatter.

350 This issue could be formulated as why does antimatter exist at all? At the moment of
 351 the Big Bang, when the universe was formed, it was extremely hot, representing enor-
 352 mous energy, and it produced both particles and antiparticles. As the temperature
 353 kept decreasing, the particles and antiparticles annihilated each other in pairs.
 354 Had they been present in equal amounts, this would have led to emptying the
 355 universe. Apparently, there was some excess of matter over antimatter in the early
 356 universe, and this meant the baryon asymmetry and from this followed that the
 357 universe now consists of matter. The big question is the origin of the initial imbalance
 358 between matter and antimatter, and there has been no solution yet for this puzzle.
 359 Sakharov did not provide the solution either, but, in 1967, he set up three require-
 360 ments that the solution, when it is found, should satisfy. One is that there must exist
 361 processes that are capable of altering the number of baryons. The next is the existence
 362 of some shift in the natural laws that favours matter over antimatter. And the third
 363 is that the processes altering the baryon number must form under the absence of
 364 thermal equilibrium – this corresponds to the process of permanent cooling of the
 365 universe ever since the initial Big Bang.

366 The theory of baryon asymmetry links the physics of fundamental particles to
 367 cosmology and Sakharov's works played a role in the emergence of the new science
 368 of 'CosmoMicroPhysics'. He investigated the problem of the expanding universe, the
 369 non-uniform distribution of matter, the reversal of the direction of time, the negative
 370 curvature of space, and the finite cosmological constant. Sakharov had a publication
 371 on an alternative theory of gravitation and his discussion differed from Albert
 372 Einstein's approach, with all the long-ranging consequences of this difference.

373 **Sakharov and Teller**

374 The authorship of the hydrogen bomb connects the names of these two scientists
 375 forever. Edward Teller has been called the father of the American hydrogen bomb
 376 and Andrei Sakharov that of the Soviet hydrogen bomb. It is doubtful whether such
 377 a label is appreciative or condemning. There is though quite broad consensus that
 378 the policy of mutually assured destruction (MAD), however horrible it sounds,
 379 restrained the two superpowers for decades from attacking one another. When, in
 380 1985, at the time of Sakharov's exile, an anthology in his honour was published
 381 in New York (*Andrei Sakharov and Peace*), Teller wrote one of its chapters in which
 382 he noted that there were similarities between them though he found their differences
 383 more significant, hence their stories could not be viewed as running in parallel.
 384 (Lozansky 1985). Sakharov and Teller met in person only once, at a banquet
 385 honouring Teller on 16 November 1988, in Washington, DC. They had a brief
 386 private exchange followed by Sakharov speaking to the gathering. He condemned
 387 the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), after which he had to leave immediately
 388 in order to catch the last plane to Boston. When Teller's turn came to speak,
 389 Sakharov was no longer there. Teller expressed his disagreement with Sakharov
 390 in the matter of SDI, but did not go into the details of their disagreement, saying

391 merely that Sakharov was ill-informed. This was a typical Tellerian approach to
392 debate – Teller should have known that the issue was of principal concern for
393 Sakharov who never addressed any issue without having been thoroughly prepared.

394 Their differences in opinion manifested themselves most conspicuously in how
395 they viewed the possible biological consequences of nuclear tests. The danger of
396 biological damage was the principal reason why Sakharov opposed further testing.
397 As for Teller, on some occasions he characterized the danger of testing as negligible
398 compared with other sources of possible biological consequences. On other occa-
399 sions, he emphasized that the unavoidable birth defects as a consequence of testing
400 was an affordable price for enhancing security.

401 The two men also differed concerning the responsibility of scientists in finding
402 solutions to the most pressing political problems. Sakharov assigned responsibility
403 to scientists and felt uneasy about nuclear destruction and argued for the moral
404 responsibility of scientists in preventing it. Teller emphasized the responsibility of
405 scientists for creating new technical solutions, but shifted the responsibility to
406 Society (or its elected representatives) in their utilization. In this, Teller appeared
407 in concert with the Soviet leadership that was critical toward Sakharov when he
408 appeared to be meddling in nuclear policy. In reality though, Teller was unstoppable
409 in his attempts to influence politicians, to sway their decisions in matters he himself
410 felt strongly about (Hargittai 2010).

411 Both declared that they did not create their respective hydrogen bombs alone and
412 that it was the work of many people. Sakharov's assessment was realistic when
413 he mentioned Vitaly Ginzburg's suggestion as one of the three fundamental ideas
414 in developing the Soviet bomb, along with the participation of Yakov Zeldovich
415 and others. In contrast, Teller belittled Stanislaw Ulam's contribution, which may
416 have triggered Teller's approach that moved the project to completion.

417 Both had excellent ability to make qualitative estimates when facing a problem
418 and arriving at a qualitative solution; only then did they elaborate the details. Both
419 reconciled fundamental research and applications; in fact, both devoted themselves
420 to seeking applications of the fruits of basic research. Both were dedicated to the
421 utilization of nuclear science for energy production. Teller in his time played a
422 leading role in creating safe operational protocols of nuclear power plants in the
423 United States. This needs emphasis as this aspect of his career is hardly known.
424 Both advocated the importance of operating nuclear power plants under ground.
425 It is now over 30 years that both declared this mandatory for new nuclear reactors
426 and their strong recommendations appear to have been unheeded.

427 They were different in their public appearances. Sakharov had a withdrawing
428 personality; he did not like impromptu interviews; he was not a practised debater.
429 Teller, however, thrived on public appearances, enjoyed live interviews and, when
430 it was a recording, he insisted that it should not be edited; rather, the transcripts
431 should appear unaltered or not at all. He was an excellent debater; most of his inter-
432 locutors thought him invincible in debate. Sadly though, he did not always operate
433 with fairness, and liked to intimate knowledge that was in his favour but that he was
434 not at liberty to divulge.



Figure 3. Sakharov's grave in the Vostryakovskoe Cemetery in Moscow (courtesy of Aleksandr Verny). Sakharov's second wife, Elena Bonner, is buried in the same grave

435 Sakharov respected Teller and his principal arguments regardless of whether he
 436 agreed with him or not. A critical comparison of the careers and views of the two should
 437 be instructive. Whether they ran in parallel, though, is questionable. To me, considering
 438 the directions of their careers and views, they followed, rather, anti-parallel paths.

439 **Demise**

440 Sakharov died in 1989 just as the Soviet Union was dissolving. His status and his
 441 contributions to his country's having become a superpower, as the 'father of the
 442 Soviet hydrogen bomb', would have made him eligible for a most prestigious burial
 443 place. He might have been buried in the Kremlin Wall, as Mstislav Keldysh and
 444 Sergei Korolev of the space programme were. He certainly could have been buried
 445 in the most exclusive Novodeviche Cemetery, as Igor Tamm, Yakov Zeldovich, and
 446 Vitaly Ginzburg of the nuclear weapons programme were (Hargittai and Hargittai,
 447 2019). When Sakharov's first wife died, he arranged for her burial at the
 448 Vostryakovskoe Cemetery, anticipating that, when the time came, he would also
 449 be buried there. Indeed, his final resting place is there, together with his second wife,
 450 not far from that of his first wife (Figure 3).



Figure 4. Statues of Feliks Dzerzhinsky (left, by E.V. Vuchetich, 1958) and Andrei Sakharov (right, by G.V. Pototsky, 2008) in the Muzeon Park, Moscow (photograph by the author).

451

Epilogue

452 The Muzeon Park is a beautiful and popular centre of art and entertainment close to
453 downtown Moscow and it includes a huge collection of statues. It began right after
454 the collapse of the Soviet Union and the intention was to collect the memorials of the
455 discredited regime. After a while though, the direction of the sculpture park changed.
456 Many of the memorials that should have become part of the collection were left in
457 their original locations, whereas many other statues that had nothing to do with the
458 Soviets were exhibited at the Muzeon Park. This is how the statues of Feliks

459 Dzerzhinsky and Andrei Sakharov happen to now stand in each other's vicinity
 460 (Figure 4). Dzerzhinsky founded the predecessor of the infamous KGB in the
 461 1920s and his monumental statue used to be a landmark on Lubyanka Square
 462 in front of the KGB (today, FSB) Headquarters. Sakharov's statue was created
 463 in 2008 and had it not been labelled properly it could be taken merely for
 464 an old man sunbathing peacefully. In juxtaposition, the two statues form a
 465 symbolic ensemble; there is Sakharov as David, and Dzerzhinsky as Goliath.
 466 David/Sakharov for years fought for human rights, which for a long time was
 467 thought to be hopeless, against an invincible regime represented here by
 468 Goliath/Dzerzhinsky. Then, finally, this frail man defeated the mighty order,
 469 which collapsed like a house of cards. Following his death, the respect for and
 470 reputation of Sakharov grew enormously. It appeared as if the process of democ-
 471 ratization in Russia, symbolized by Sakharov, won – using a favourite expression
 472 of Soviet times – a complete and final victory over the forces symbolized by
 473 Dzerzhinsky. Alas, the development in Russia during the past years and decades
 474 demonstrates that Sakharov's victory may have not been complete, nor final
 475 (this is as of Fall 2020). There may be need for new Sakharovs!

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